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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ms. Bates timely appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction. On 
appeal, she argues that the district court erred when it failed inquire into Ms. Bates' 
request for substitute counsel. She also argues that the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea and that her sentence is 
excessively harsh. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Police responded to a call reporting a missing person, Robert Marek. 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) When they arrived at 
Mr. Marek's home, they noticed a fire in a fire pit in the back yard and what appeared to 
be human body parts located in and around the fire. (PSI, p.2.) The police received 
information indicating that Ms. Bates was Mr. Marek's niece and that she had recently 
been staying at his home. (PSI, p.2.) An autopsy confirmed that there were human 
remains around the fire, which belonged to Mr. Marek. (PSI, p.2.) Ms. Bates was 
interrogated by the police and admitted that she had killed Mr. Marek. (PSI, p.2.) 
Ms. Bates was charged, by information, with first degree murder. (R., pp.28-29.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State filed an amended information alleging second 
degree murder and, in return, Ms. Bates entered an Alford1 plea to second degree 
murder. (R., pp.88-91.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified life sentence, 
with thirty years fixed. (R., pp.102-103.) Ms. Bates timely appealed. (R., pp.108-110.) 
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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Ms. Bates filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion 
requesting leniency, which was denied by the district court.2 While her appeal was 
pending, Ms. Bates also filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea and requested the 
appointment of new counsel, both of which were denied by the district court. 3 
2 The materials related to the Rule 35 motion are located in the July 13, 2013 Motion to 
Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof. 
3 The materials related to the motion to withdraw Ms. Bates' guilty plea are located in 
the July 13, 2013 Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule and 
Statement in Support Thereof. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Bates' motion for the appointment of 
new counsel to represent her in regard to her motion to withdraw her guilty plea? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Bates' motion to 
withdraw her guilty plea? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified life sentence, 
with thirty years fixed, upon Ms. Bates following her plea of guilty to second 
degree murder? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Bates' Rule 35 
motion requesting leniency? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Bates' Motion For The Appointment Of 
New Counsel To Represent Her In Regard To Her Motion To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea 
A. Standard Of Review 
The determination of whether a court conducted an adequate inquiry into why 
substitute counsel should have been appointed and whether a person wishes to reject 
the court appointed counsel and self-represent is reviewed de novo. See State v. Peck, 
130 Idaho 711 (Ct. App. 1997). 
B. The District Court Inadequately Inquired Into Ms. Bates' Request For Substitute 
Counsel 
Idaho Code Section 19-852 provides criminal defendants a statutory right to 
counsel. I.C. § 19-852. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a statutory right to 
counsel carries with it the correlative right to the effective assistance of counsel. 
State v. Hall,_ P.3d _, 2013 WL 6225673, at *4 (2013);4 see also Hernandez v. 
State, 127 Idaho 685, 687 (1995) ("We can see no legitimate basis for determining 
whether there has been a violation of the right to effective of counsel guaranteed by 
I.C. § 19-852 differently from determining whether there has been a violation of a 
similar constitutional right."). "The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel." 
State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 594 (Ct. App. 2007). 
"It is well settled that an indigent's right to court-appointed counsel includes the 
right to effective assistance of counsel, but it does not necessarily include the right to an 
4 The Hall Opinion analyzed the right to conflict free counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings after the imposition of the death penalty. 
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attorney of one's own choice." State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 11 (Ct. App. 1995). While a 
criminal defendant does not have the right to counsel of her choice, "for 'good cause' a 
trial court may, in its discretion, appoint a substitute attorney for an indigent defendant." 
Lippert, 145 Idaho at 594. "An accused also has the right to waive court-appointed 
counsel and to conduct his or her own defense." Id. "A defendant is not required to 
show good cause for the desire to exercise that right." Id. "The trial court must afford 
the defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of a 
motion for substitution of counsel after having been made aware of the problems 
involved." Id. (emphasis in original). This inquiry must occur even if the district court 
has "well-founded suspicions of intentional delay and manipulative tactics," there can be 
"no substitute for the inquires necessary to protect a defendant's constitutional rights." 
Peck, 130 Idaho at 714. 
While a district court must afford a defendant a full and fair opportunity to present 
facts to support the request for the appointment of counsel, the duty to inquire does not 
impose an onerous burden on the court. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court found 
that this duty to inquire was satisfied when the trial court asked the defendant to make 
any statements he desired in support of his motion for substitute counsel. State v. 
Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898 (1980). Conversely, in Peck, supra, this duty to inquire 
was not satisfied when the Mr. Peck was not allowed to address the court concerning 
his desire for substitute trial counsel. Peck 130 Idaho at 713-14. In coming to that 
conclusion, the Idaho Court of Appeals reasoned as follows: 
As [Mr. Peck) points out, this Court cannot discern whether he had 
legitimate grounds for his request for new counsel, such as an actual 
conflict of interest or a deficiency in the public defenders' performance. 
Nor can we ascertain from the record whether Peck wished to represent 
himself, as was his right, in preference to continuing with representation 
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by the appointed counsel. The record reveals no reason for summarily 
rejecting [Mr. Peck's} request, as the district court appears to have done. 
Id. at 714. As stated above, this duty imposes a minimal burden on a district court. 
Once a defendant has requested the appointment of substitute counsel, the district 
court must provide a defendant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the request, 
even if the district court has "well founded suspicions" that the request is merely a 
means to manipulate the court. Id. 
In this case, the district court failed to provide Ms. Bates the opportunity to 
explain why she was requesting substitute counsel. Ms. Bates was represented by the 
same defense attorney at the change of plea hearing, sentencing hearing, the Rule 35 
hearing, and the hearing on the motion to withdraw her guilty plea. (R., pp.88-89, 99-
101; Minutes of the Rule 35 hearing held on December 14, 2012 (Augmentation); 
05/17/13 Tr., p.3.) In Ms. Bates' affidavit in support of her motion to withdraw her guilty 
plea, she wrote the following: 
I was persistently forced in to signing I was tricked by only reading 
last page last signing after just haven [sic] read a continue 2 second x 
second day of meeting, for a more time to come up with money for trial 
Not properly investigated knowledge with held knowledge of others 
confession and explanasion [sic) the cover up 
Motion of new counsel 
(Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) (Augmentation), 
p.1.) Ms. Bates recognizes that the foregoing statements are somewhat unclear. 
However, when the phrase "Motion of new counsel" is read in conjunction with the 
preceding two paragraphs, it indicates that she wants a substitution of trial counsel 
because she was tricked into agreeing to plead guilty and that there was a cover-up 
and another person confessed to the killing. From this record, one cannot tell to a 
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degree of reasonable certainty whether Ms. Bates wanted a substitute attorney or 
wanted to represent herself pro se. In light of the clear standards set forth by the Idaho 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the district court should have, at a minimum, 
ordered Ms. Bates to appear telephonically at the hearing on the motion to withdraw 
her guilty plea and ask her why she wanted the appointment of substitute counsel. 
Additionally, if this matter is remanded on the foregoing basis, and the district 
court appoints substitute counsel, Ms. Bates is also entitled to another hearing on her 
Rule 35 motion as Ms. Bates' request for substitute counsel, which was lodged with the 
district court on October 22, 2012, preceded the December 14, 2012, hearing on 
Ms. Bates' Rule 35 motion. (Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Pursuant to I.C.R. 33(c) 
(Augmentation); Minutes of the Rule 35 hearing held on December 14, 2012 
(Augmentation).) 
In sum, this case must be remanded to afford Ms. Bates the opportunity to 
explain why she requested the appointment of substitute counsel. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Bates' Motion To Withdraw 
Her Guilty Plea 
A. Standard Of Review 
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as 
distinguished from arbitrary action. State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 121 (Ct. App. 
1986). "When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is: (1) whether the lower 
court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within 
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the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (quoting Associates 
Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605 (Ct. App.1987)). 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Bates' Motion To 
Withdraw Her Guilty Plea 
Motions for withdrawal of pleas are governed by I.C.R. 33(c). Whether to grant a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court and such 
discretion should be liberally applied. Freeman, 110 Idaho at 121. After a defendant 
has been sentenced, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea generally will be granted only to 
correct manifest injustice. Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c); State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 
887 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 361 (Ct. App. 1997). It is the 
defendant's burden to show that a manifest injustice would result if the motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea were denied. State v. Gomez, 124 Idaho 177, 178 (Ct. App. 
1993). Manifest injustice will be found if the plea was not taken in compliance with 
constitutional due process standards, which require that a guilty plea be entered 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Huffman, 137 Idaho at 887; Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 
Ms. Bates can establish that the denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty 
resulted in a manifest injustice as her plea was not knowing and intelligent. In reliance 
on I.C.R. 11, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that in order for a guilty plea to be 
knowing and intelligent the defendant must be advised of all the direct consequences 
resulting from the entry of the plea, which includes the minimum and maximum 
punishments. State v. Way, 117 Idaho 594, 597 (Ct. App. 1990). According to trial 
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counsel, Ms. Bates was not informed at the change of plea hearing that second degree 
murder has a minimum sentence of ten years. (04/12/13 Tr., p.11, L.19 - p. 12, L.3; 
05/17/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.13-21.) As such, her guilty plea was not entered knowingly and 
intelligently. 
Ms. Bates also argues that her guilty plea was not voluntary as it was the product 
of coercion and fraud. "A plea of guilty is deemed coerced only where it is improperly 
induced by ignorance, fear or fraud." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 537 (Ct. App. 
2008). In this case, Ms. Bates asserted that she was forced into signing the plea 
agreement because the district court would not grant a continuance to afford her more 
time to come up with money for trial. (Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 33(c), Augmentation, p.1.) Ms. Bates also asserted that she was "tricked" 
into signing the plea agreement and was only shown the last page of the agreement. 
(Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c), Augmentation, 
p.1.) While no more elaboration was provided to support these claims, it does appear 
from Ms. Bates' affidavit that she was coerced to enter her guilty plea due to financial 
pressures and that her guilty plea was obtained by fraud. 
Additionally, Ms. Bates' guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary as 
she asserted the existence of a Brady violation. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held 
that the constitutional validity of a guilty plea can be undermined in the event the State 
fails to disclose both exculpatory and material evidence prior to the entry of the plea. 
State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428 (Ct. App. 1994). Before establishing that the 
undisclosed evidence is both exculpatory and material, the "Brady violation should be 
evaluated in light of all the attendant circumstances, including the following three 
5 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
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factors: (1) whether the plea was entered with advice of counsel, (2) whether the plea-
taking procedure complied with Boykin v. Alabama, 6 and (3) whether a factual basis 
was established for the plea, i.e., whether the defendant's admissions fully establish his 
factual guilt." Id. at 434-435. In this case, Ms. Bates does not challenge the fact that 
her guilty plea was entered with the advice of counsel. However and as argued above, 
she does argue that the guilty plea colloquy was inadequate as she was not informed 
about that she was pleading guilty to an offense with a ten year minimum sentence. 
(04/12/13 Tr., p.11, L.19-p. 12, L.3; 05/17/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.13-21.) 
Ms. Bates also challenges the factual basis for her offense. In Gardner, supra, 
the defendant did not challenge that his plea was either un-counseled or that the plea 
colloquy was constitutionally infirm. Id. at 435. The Court of Appeals held that the 
defendant could challenge the validity of his guilty plea based on the Brady violation 
because he did not provide a factual basis for all of the elements for the offense to 
which he pleaded guilty. Id. In this case, Ms. Bates entered an Alford plea and, as 
such, did not provide a factual basis for her offense. (R., pp.88-89.) In fact, Ms. Bates 
asserted her innocence throughout the change of plea hearing and only pleaded guilty 
because "I don't agree with the evidence that's been put forth. Do I agree? I agree that 
yes, there could always be evidence that the State could put forth to convict any one 
person." (04/04/12 Tr., p.17, Ls.16-19.) After she made that statement, she reiterated, 
"I know I can go down for this, but I did not kill Robert Marek. I did not kill Uncle Bob." 
(04/04/12 Tr., p.18, Ls.21-22.) Since an Alford plea was entered in this case and since 
Ms. Bates maintained her innocence, she did not provide a factual basis for the offense, 
6 See Boykin (requiring an affirmative showing on the record that the guilty plea was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary). 
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and the alleged Brady violation can be the basis to undermine the district court's 
conclusion that her guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 
Since Ms. Bates has established that she did not provide a factual basis for her 
guilty plea she must establish that the undisclosed evidence is both exculpatory and 
material in order to establish manifest injustice. Gardner, 126 Idaho at 436. In her 
motion to withdraw her guilty plea, Ms. Bates stated that there was no proper 
investigation in this matter and that information pertaining to a third party's confession 
was withheld from her as part of a "cover up." (Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Pursuant 
to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c), Augmentation, p.1.) If a third party had confessed to the 
killing of Mr. Marek and information about an intentional "cover up" of this confession is 
clearly exculpatory and material as it indicates that a person other than Ms. Bates is 
guilty. Therefore, the district court erred when it denied Ms. Bates' motion to withdraw 
her guilty plea as the Brady violation undermined the constitutional validity of her plea 
and the district court's denial of her motion constituted a manifest injustice. 
In sum, Ms. Bates' guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary as she 
was not informed about the ten year mandatory sentence, was tricked into signing her 
plea agreement, and argued a Brady violation. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Life Sentence, With 
Thirty Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Bates Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Second Degree 
Murder 
Ms. Bates asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified life sentence, with 
thirty years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court 
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an 
independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the 
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character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 
103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Bates does not allege that 
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Ms. Bates must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
Ms. Bates suffers from severe mental health issues. These issues are so severe 
that they dominated the sentencing hearing. (See generally 05/24/12 Tr.) In fact, both 
the State and the district court agreed that specific deterrence is not an issue in this 
case because Ms. Bates cannot comprehend the true nature of her actions. (05/24/12 
Tr., p.62, L.13 - p.63, L.2, p.76, Ls.13-19.) The district court also concluded, based on 
the implicit premise that it is futile to punish a person that does not comprehend her 
actions, that retribution is not much of a factor in this case. (05/24/12 Tr., p.76, L.11-
21.) As such, the only truly relevant sentencing factors in this case are rehabilitation 
and the protection of society. With that in mind, the district court concluded that 
Ms. Bates was amenable to mental health rehabilitation if she receives prolonged and 
intense therapy. (05/24/12 Tr., p.76, L.22 - p.77, L.4.) As such, Ms. Bates argues that 
thirty years fixed is excessive, and that the fixed portion of her sentence should be in 
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the range of ten to fifteen years. Such a sentence would provide her with the prolonged 
access to intense therapy identified by the district court, which would promote both 
rehabilitation and protection of society. If she is stabilized, reducing the fixed portion of 
her sentence would enable her to get reintegrated into the community while she still has 
a significant portion of her life ahead of her. 
Additionally, there are various mitigating factors present in this matter which 
support the conclusion that Ms. Bates' sentence is excessively harsh. As mentioned 
above, the most significant mitigating factor in this case is Ms. Bates' mental health. As 
a child, Ms. Bates received a head injury which inhibits her ability to read and write. 
(PSI, p.8.) Despite this injury, Ms. Bates' aunt, Deanne Turcott, testified at sentencing, 
that Ms. Bates was a normal child. (05/24/12 Tr., p.31, L.24 - p.32, L.12.) Ms. Turcott 
went on to state that when Ms. Bates was between twelve and thirteen years old, she 
began to change. (05/24/12 Tr., p.32, Ls.13-14.) Ms. Turcott described the change in 
Ms. Bates as follows: 
[S]he started to kind of disconnect with the world and reality. She got 
caught up in some drugs, started to get into trouble with the law. 
She lived with me and my husband for about six months when she was 
around 15. And her mind got so focused on the fact that everyone was 
either physically or sexually or emotionally abusing her that it kind of 
became unsafe for her to be with us any longer. She started to believe 
that people were abusing her and making accusations. And the neighbor 
kids came to me and said, "She's -- she's got some ... illusions here. 
She's starting to think that you guys are all abusing her." 
(05/24/12 Tr., p.32, L.13 - p.33, L.5.) Ms. Turcott then expressed her sorrow for the loss 
of Mr. Marek. (05/24/12 Tr., p.34, L.19 - p.35, L.3.) She said he was a caring man with 
a big heart and a gentle soul. (05/24/12 Tr., p.34, L.19 - p.35, L.3.) She then went on 
to state the following: 
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I'm just asking the Court to recognize that Melisa's broke [sic]. 
Something inside her snapped ... a long time ago. And even though my 
brother and sister did everything they could do to get her help -- and I 
believe they did -- there wasn't really a lot of help to get. And in Idaho 
there really continues not to be a lot of help to get. 
I am afraid for Melisa, and despite all the psychological evals that 
[say] she is normal and able to stand trial, I don't think she really 
understands or ever was able to stand trial. I don't believe it, and I don't 
think anybody in here does either. 
I hope [someday] there will be a real diagnosis for Melisa, something that 
they can treat, something that can help her, fix whatever got broke [sic] all 
those years ago. [I] [h]ope that she'll understand the extent of what 
happened and to live as a normal person someday. 
(05/24/12 Tr., p.35, L.4 - p.36, L.18.) 
Ms. Turcott's concerns over Ms. Bates' paranoid delusions about Ms. Bates' 
sexual and physical victimization are consistent with version of events contained in the 
police report documenting the interrogation of Ms. Bates. In that report, Officer Berger 
wrote that Mr. Marek had told a friend that he was concerned about Ms. Bates as she 
had accused him of wanting to have sex with her. (Police Report written by Officer 
Berger, attached to PSI, p.3.) During the interrogation of Ms. Bates she cryptically 
mentioned self defense, Mr. Marek, and incest. (Police Report written by Officer 
Berger, attached to PSI, p.5.) 
Ms. Bates' trial counsel reaffirmed Ms. Turcott's statement that Ms. Bates was a 
normal child until she entered her early teenage years. (05/24/12 Tr., p.63, L.9 - p.64, 
L.6.) According to trial counsel, Ms. Bates disappeared for a few days and might have 
ingested a drug or toxin that caused her mental health issues. (05/24/12 Tr., p.64, Ls.4-
14.) Trial counsel indicated that her diagnoses were not consistent and they have 
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included borderline personality disorder, antisocial disorder, drug and alcohol 
dependence, depression, mental illness, post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar 
disorder, brain injury, cognitive disjunction, and dual personality disorder. (05/24/12 
Tr., p.64, L.24 - p.65, L.17.) Counsel went on to state that it's "almost like we get a dart 
and throw it at the wall and that's her diagnosis." (05/24/12 Tr., p.65, Ls.12-16.) For 
example, Dr. Barkley diagnosed Ms. Bates with Chronic Undifferentiated Schizophrenia 
in 2004, and in 2012 Dr. Hayes did not determine she was schizophrenic; instead, 
Dr. Hayes diagnosed her as having Major Depressive Disorder and Borderline 
Personality Disorder. (Mental Health Report written by Dr. Hayes, dated May 20, 2012 
(Augmentation), pp. 7, 9-11.) 
Ms. Bates was also involuntarily committed in her early twenties. When she was 
twenty one years old, she was charged with writing a check with insufficient funds and 
was deemed incompetent to go forward with her defense. (Mitigation Report Vol. I 
(Augmentation), p.312.) As a result, she was involuntarily committed to the State 
Hospital North. (Mitigation Report Vol. I (Augmentation), p.312.) The doctor who found 
her incompetent stated that she was profoundly impaired and could barely 
communicate. (Mitigation Report Vol. I (Augmentation), p.312.) Ms. Bates was 
stabilized and discharged from the facility approximately six months after her admission. 
(Mitigation Report Vol. I (Augmentation), pp.313-316.) This evinces that Ms. Bates is 
amenable to mental health treatment. 
Additionally, Ms. Bates' substance addiction is a mitigating factor. Ms. Bates was 
exposed to alcohol when she was a toddler and used "sippie cups" to consume the 
alcohol. (PSI, p.9.) Ms. Bates' use of alcohol and other substances persisted 
throughout her childhood and teenage years. (Mitigation Report Vol. I (Augmentation), 
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pp.255-256, 359.)7 When Ms. Bates was fourteen years old, one evaluator concluded 
that alcohol and substance abuse were considerable problems for Ms. Bates. 
(Mitigation Report Vol. I (Augmentation), pp.256.) Ms Bates was in a "drug juvenile 
detention" facility when she was sixteen. (Mitigation Report Vol. I (Augmentation), 
p.412.) 
Ms. Bates was also the victim of abuse as a child. It was so bad that she was 
placed into foster care at the age of twelve. (Mitigation Report Vol. I (Augmentation), 
pp.348-349, 412.) One of Ms. Bates' neighbors reported an incident in which her father 
was sitting on her while "shoving rocks down her throat." (Mitigation Report Vol. II 
(Augmentation), p.192.) Ms. Bates stated that she had been raped by a twenty three 
year old when she was eleven years old, became pregnant, and then miscarried. 
(Mental Health Report written by Dr. Hayes, dated May 20, 2012 (Augmentation), p.4.) 
Despite the foregoing setbacks, Ms. Bates is hardworking and sacrificed years of 
her life to help others. One of her friends, Scott Taylor, had a mother that needed 
twenty-four hour care because she was an Alzheimer's patient. (05/24/2012 Tr., p.43, 
L.2 - p.44, L. 17.) Ms. Bates lived with Mr. Taylor for approximately three and one-half 
years. (05/24/12 Tr., p.45, Ls.5-11. p.47, L.13 - p.49, L.17.) During that time, 
Ms. Bates played an indispensable role changing bed sheets and washing clothes. 
(05/24/12 Tr., p.44, Ls.20-25.) She also bathed and fed Mr. Taylor's mother. (05/24/12 
Tr., p.23-24.) According to Mr. Taylor, "I personally don't believe that Melisa was 
capable of these atrocities. I don't know. And no matter where or what happens from 
here, I would like to see that Melisa got help to take care of whatever her problems are." 
7 For ease of citation the pages in the Mitigation Report have been numbered 
sequentially. 
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(05/24/12 Tr., p.46, Ls.13-17.) On this note, M's. Bates' trial counsel stated that in her 
support letters she was considered by others as loving, happy, pleasant, respectful, 
trustworthy, grateful, helpful, caring, friendly, patient, busy, and selfless. (05/24/12 
Tr., p.65, Ls.67-24.) 
Ms. Bates also has support and is trusted by other people in the community. For 
example, William Sexton wrote a letter to the court which stated that she is hard-
working, and that he trusted her with the key to his home. (Letter written by William 
Sexton (augmentation).) Patti Naccarato wrote the court a letter indicating that she is 
"eternally grateful" to Ms. Bates for saving Ms. Naccarato's husband's life. (Letter 
written by Patti R. Naccarato (Augmentation).) Ms. Naccarato also stated that she 
never had any reason to mistrust Ms. Bates. (Letter written by Patti R. Naccarato 
(Augmentation).) Mr. Naccarato also wrote a letter expressing sentiments similar to his 
wife's. (Letter written by Roland Naccarato (Augmentation).) These are just a few 
examples of the positive support letters Ms. Bates received, the majority of which depict 
her as a caring and hardworking person that is trusted in the community. (Letters 
written by Robert and Linda Carroll, Gordon Nyberg, James B. Keirklie, Jacque 
Knowles, and Mary Kuhfuss (Augmentation).) 
There was one letter which indicated that Ms. Bates had verbally accosted a 
couple and they were scared of Ms. Bates. (Letter written by Randy and Vicki Rowe 
(Augmentation).) Shad Panter wrote a support letter indicating that some of the Rowes' 
opinions of Ms. Bates should be discredited. (Letter written by Shad Panter 
(Augmentation).) Mr. Panter wrote the following about the Rowes: 
I have heard that Randy and [Vickie] Rowe ... have written [a] very 
disparaging [letter] about [Ms. Bates] and I would disagree with them on 
this as it seems to me they are the worst culprits of harassing her to play 
to her weaknesses to get a rise out of her. And I do not like bullies. As far 
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[as] the police getting a confession out of her it's bogus with her 
diagnosed mental state you push hard and long enough she'll break and 
give anything you want to escape adversity. Which they may not have 
known at the time but to [punish her further] and keep her away from 
friends is unnecessary and fruitless and a waste of taxes .... 
(Letter written by Shad Panter (Augmentation).) As such, Ms. Bates can function in the 
community and many people trust and care for her. 
In sum, Ms. Bates suffers from severe mental health issues, which inhibit her 
ability to understand the underlying offense. However, she is amenable to mental 
health treatment and when she is stabilized she is considered by the community as a 
hardworking and caring person. As such, the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing an excessively harsh sentence. 
IV. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Bates' Rule 35 Motion 
Requesting Leniency 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the 
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original 
sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, 
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional 
information presented with the motion for reduction. Id. 
Ms. Bates provided new information in support of her Rule 35 motion. After 
Ms. Bates was sentenced she completed the "Living with Mental Illness Class." 
(Supplemental Motion to Reduce Sentence (Augmentation), p.2.) Ms. Bates is also "a 
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Janitor of Unit 3 where she sweeps, mops and cleans rooms. She also mows yards. 
Ms. Bates is allowed to wear regular jeans and shirts. She earns $0.30 per hour." 
(Supplemental Motion to Reduce Sentence {Augmentation), p.2.) Ms. Bates has not 
been a problem in that facility. (Supplemental Motion to Reduce Sentence 
(Augmentation), p.2.) 
In sum, the district court abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 35 motion 
requesting leniency as Ms. Bates new information indicated that she was making 
rehabilitative progress after she was sentenced in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Bates respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with 
instructions for the district court to inquire into Ms. Bates' request for substitute counsel. 
Ms. Bates also requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions to allow 
Ms. Bates to withdraw her guilty plea. Alternatively, Ms. Bates requests that this Court 
reduce the fixed portion of her sentence from thirty years to either ten or fifteen years. 
DATED this 13th day of January, 2014. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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